British historians will say that the founding fathers of early modern anti-French polemic were sixteenth and seventeenth century English protestants. By the same token, Dutch historians will say that the founding fathers of early modern anti-French polemic were sixteenth and seventeenth century Dutch protestants. In both cases, the underlying assumption is that this discourse revolved around a widening cultural gap between catholic and protestant nations.

My talk will serve to challenge these two converging assumptions. And, to do this, I will be stressing one main point: the fuel for anti-French, anti-catholic and, by extension, anti-Stuart propaganda was provided by a publicist called François-Paul de Lisola, who was no protestant but originally the catholic servant of the catholic Holy Roman Emperor. It is indeed a supreme irony that a Habsburg polemicist should have been the driving-force behind English anti-French feeling and the Anglo-Dutch alliance of 1677.

I will start with the state of the historiography of the Anglo-Dutch alliance of the 1670s. Before doing so, however, I want to run you through some key elements of the European context of the years 1667-1673. The end of the second Anglo-Dutch war, in 1667, coincided with the French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. The Spanish Netherlands—that is, Belgium today—served as buffer-zone between France and the Dutch Republic. Its territorial integrity was also vital to English interests for, as Andrew Marvell himself emphasized in 1677, ‘The Spanish Netherlands have always been considered as the natural frontier of England’. Marvell echoed a point made by Lisola in letter of 1669 to Arlington. ‘It seems to me’, he argued, ‘that we should consider the business of the Spanish Netherlands as our own given the grievous woes that would befall us if they were to be invaded’.

This explains why Charles II and Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt signed a Triple Alliance with Sweden in 1668. The two principal architects of this protestant alliance, in fact, were Sir William Temple and Lisola who both in different and complementary ways managed to drag the Grand Pensionary into an anti-French league. Lisola, in particular, believed Johan de Witt to be ‘slavishly reliant on the French’ because of the choice he made, on behalf of the Amsterdam regents, to avoid war at all cost. Lisola had originally hoped to drag the Emperor into this alliance but what he didn’t know was that Leopold had signed a secret agreement with Louis over the sharing of the spoils of the Spanish Netherlands. As cousins and rivals in the Spanish succession, they had good reasons to want to broker a deal over the Spanish Netherlands.
Charles II, to come back to him, was a double-dealer: like his brother, the duke of York, he loathed the Dutch, not the least because the De Witt regime upheld anti-monarchical principles and still harboured some regicides. So, in the late 1660s, Charles II entered into a secret alliance with Louis, striking a cash-and-conversion deal which, he hoped, might boost the Crown’s limited financial resources.

In 1672, Louis XIV stormed the Low Countries with a mighty army. The De Witt regime was toppled, bringing the Oranges back to office after a period of political wilderness that had lasted more than two decades. The Stuarts’ hope of finally avenging the Chatham disaster of 1667 was shattered by the naval defeat of Solebay in June 1672. This is the moment, according to the established historiography, when it all began. To continue the war, Charles II needed to call a new Parliament; to squeeze some subsidies out of his new Parliament, Charles II needed to make some major concessions, all the more so as he had declared war on the Dutch in without calling a Parliament. The message of the Country party in 1673 was very clear: ditch the French, pitch Anglo-Dutch.

What the Country party demanded was a protestant alliance against a menacing catholic sovereign. Louis’ Dutch war, in the words of William Russell (son of Francis), was a ‘catholic war’ and, for a catholic war against the Dutch protestants—republic or not made no difference here—, there was no reason to provide Charles II with the required subsidies. So, in the end, Charles II was forced to pull out of the war. A peace treaty was signed with the Dutch in 1674. The same year began the marriage negotiations between William of Orange and Mary Stuart, culminating in the wedding and the alliance of 1677.

Since the publication in 1953 of Kenneth Haley’s ground-breaking book called William of Orange and the English opposition and the (belated) discovery of the Fagel papers by non-Dutch scholars, the conventional story is that the Anglo-Dutch rapprochement of 1673 came as a result, among other things, of the underground propaganda work led by Gaspar Fagel and Pieter du Moulin. They liaised with members of the Country party and they contributed to the publication of a vitriolic anti-French pamphlet that was circulated during the parliamentary session of 1673.

The full title of this pamphlet is England’s Appeal from the Private Cabal to the Great Council of the Nation, the Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled, by a true lover of the Country. It was published anonymously, of course, and the question of its authorship remains a moot point. Haley and his followers mention Lisola as a possible contributor but without taking this hypothesis further. That’s what I want to do in this paper. Another important point made in the more recent historiography—I’m referring here to an essay by Steven Pincus published in 1995—is that the shift from anti-Dutch to anti-French feeling occurred in 1673, partly because of the considerable impact exerted by England’s Appeal from the Private Cabal. I tend to take a different view, for at least two reasons: first, there was an overlap between anti-Dutch and anti-French feeling because xenophobia, in essence, remains profoundly irrational; second, Steven Pincus underestimates the role played by Lisola’s writings prior to the ‘tilt’ of 1673.

A brief word about Lisola historiography. The founding study of Lisola scholarship was published by Alfred Francis Pribram in 1894 and called Franz...
Paul Lisola, Freiherr von Lisola und die Politik Seiner Zeit. It’s an important book, both neatly laid out and carefully researched, but, as Mark Baumanns has recently shown, it tends to take its cue from the anti-French arguments of late nineteenth century German nationalism. Late twentieth century studies by scholars like Heinz Ducchardt, Konrad Repgen or, more recently, Mark Baumanns have clearly moved away from this paradigm, but Lisola remains the centerpiece of a German World Picture and little room is made for non-German sources. It is one of the main purposes of this talk to rethink Lisola scholarship in a transnational perspective.

So, given the fact that I feel bold enough to make a serious dent into the existing historiography by moving Lisola from back to front-stage, I need to introduce the main hero of my story. I also need to explain how our existing knowledge of Lisola’s diplomatic and intellectual activities tell us something about the role of a ‘Hapsburg connection’ in the framing of English foreign policy. We know a fair amount about the French and Dutch connections, but virtually nothing about the ‘Hapsburg connection’. To put things bluntly, it’s an untrodden path; a path I now want to explore with you.

Lisola’s life and career bear testimony to the vital need for a transnational approach to his work. Born in 1613 into a wealthy bourgeois family of Besançon, in Spanish Franche-Comté, Lisola embraced a legal career before moving to Vienna. Lisola’s career can be best described as a mix of shuttle diplomacy and intense anti-French pamphleteering. He was a Janus-like figure in the world of early modern diplomacy: negotiator and pamphleteer; an unusual combination of skills which coloured the nature of his missions abroad. Sir William Temple seems to have been impressed the first time he met Lisola in Brussels in 1667. These were his words to Charles II:

> I found a person that seems to be of equal-temper, plain and sound understanding, studied, and yet easy in conversation an in short very many marks of honneste homme and par negotiis [a fellow negotiator], so that I doubt not but HM will be very satisfied with his person whatever his negotiation may prove.

No doubt Lisola’s multilingual and cosmopolitan profile—he speaks of himself as ‘a citizen of the world’ in The Buckler of State of 1667—contributed to the success of his many diplomatic missions as a representative of the Imperial crown.

His first mission took him to the Court of Charles I, in the early 1640s, where he sought to bolster the interests of an Austrian party against the French party that the ‘Puritans’, as he called them, embraced to check Spain’s commercial and maritime ambitions. The published letters of this mission display a youthful appetite for anti-French polemics and a remarkable eye for the subtle maneuvering of early Civil War party politics. On his return to Vienna in 1645, Lisola came back with a first-hand knowledge of English politics which proved tremendously useful in the otherwise different context of the early 1670s.

After the peace of Vasvár of 1664 between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, Lisola was sent to Madrid in a bid to set up a pro-Austrian faction at the Spanish Court as a counterbalance to the powerful existing pro-French faction. The death of Philip IV in 1665 made it strategically vital for the two branches of the
Habsburgs to stick together in the face of Louis’s legal pretensions to the Spanish Netherlands.

One tends to overlook the fact that Louis actually made a strong legal case for the annexation of the Spanish Netherlands. In 1659, France and Spain had concluded the treaty of the Pyrenees. Philip IV had to cede some territories but he also had to concede to the marriage of his daughter Maria Theresa who, originally, was going to marry her cousin of Austria Leopold. It was also agreed that, with this marriage, Maria Theresa explicitly renounced all rights to her father’s inheritance, among which the Spanish Netherlands. As a compensation, a hefty dowry of 500 000 gold écus was promised to Louis. The Spanish Crown, however, was bankrupt; as Mazarin had rightly predicted, the dowry was not paid. So: Louis’ lawyers made a case for a territorial compensation in the name of the so-called ‘right of Devolution’.

This is where Lisola comes in. He is rightly considered to be the author of *The Buckler of State and Justice*, a widely publicized anti-French pamphlet which ran eight editions between 1667 and 1701 and was translated into no less than six languages, including Dutch and Italian (language of the Imperial Court). Key intellectual figures of late Stuart England like John Locke and John Evelyn held a copy of *The Buckler of State* in their personal library. The publication of *The Buckler of State and Justice* came as a response to Antoine Aubery’s *Traité des droits de la reine* (1666), which basically argued that Maria Theresa, unlike her younger half-brother Carlos II, was entitled to the Spanish Netherlands because she was a result of Philip’s first marriage with Elizabeth of Bourbon, daughter of King Henry IV of France. First came first.

The interesting thing is that the French Crown went out of its way to convince its neighbours that its claim to the Spanish Netherlands was legally grounded. In other words, the French invasion of Flanders in 1667 was not a whimsical display of force by a greedy sovereign. The fact of the matter is that Louis’ foreign minister, Hugues de Lionne, asked Charles II’s ambassador to Paris, Jermyn St Alban’s to circulate Aubery’s legal treaty in England. And, according to an English pamphlet of 1667, copies of this treaty were to be found everywhere across Europe (V, 142). Not without reason, Louis was believed to be orchestrating a massive public media campaign.

In this context, Lisola’s *Buckler of State* came as a forceful refutation of Aubery’s legal treaty. There were in fact two strands to Lisola’s arguments. First, a legal strand. Lisola was a lawyer by training and it is in this capacity that he sought to undermine the arguments made by his French counterparts. To make a case for Maria Theresa’s rights to the Spanish Netherlands, Louis’ lawyers had unearthed an obscure law of Brabant which nullified the French Queen’s renouncement to the Spanish Netherlands. But this law, argued Lisola, was a private law, not a public law. And, ‘for sovereignties to be ruled by local customs (rather than a marriage treaty) would be as monstrous as letting Kings set limitations on God’s providence’. So: public law remains public.

There was also a political strand to Lisola’s *Buckler of State* and this explains why, according to Ruvigny, Louis’ French ambassador to London, the MPs of Charles II’s 1667 Parliament read it with such interest and profit. What was it, then, in *The Buckler of State* that fitted into their own understanding of European geopolitics? The first thing that needs to be said is that, by the mid-
1660s, Lisola enjoyed the reputation of a trouble-maker. Sir Joseph Williamson, Arlington’s Under Secretary of State, received several anonymous warnings between 1666 and 1667 about Lisola’s noxious underground influence. It is no accident, therefore, that Lisola should have assumed the posture of a ‘citizen of the world’ in *The Buckler of State*. Aside from a reference to a standard humanistic virtue, Lisola was brushing aside accusations of being the Trojan horse of an Austria party in Europe.

One of the main targets Lisola set himself in *The Buckler of State* was to rejuvenate the notion of ‘universal monarchy’ by turning it against Louis XIV. One of the key points made by Lisola was the following:

> It is our purpose to defend the common bulwark against a vast design, which hath for its cause nothing but the predominant desire of conquests, for its end dominion, for its means arms and intricacies, nor for its limit anything but what chance will prescribe *in fine*; we are here to decide the fortune of Europe, and to pronounce the sentence of either its freedom or slavery.

One word about translation, before moving on to content. The English expression ‘common bulwark’ faithfully translates the French ‘*boulevard commun*’. ‘*Boulevard*’ was a seventeenth century term for fortification—nothing to do with what we now call *boulevard* in French cities. For some reason, the Dutch translation opts for a much looser expression (‘*groot bestaan*’) which fails to render the precise meaning of ‘*boulevard*’.

The ‘common bulwark’, of course, refers here to the Spanish Netherlands. The interesting thing is that, in the mid-1660s, the Spanish Netherlands, due to a lack of subsidies, were poorly fortified. The correspondence of its then governor-general Castel-Rodrigo made it repeatedly clear to the Queen Regent that the Spanish Netherlands were in fact open to French invasion. So: the English and the Dutch were right to be concerned. According to Ruvigny, the MPs of 1667 argued that ‘England would be unable to withstand a French invasion after the conquest of these provinces [Spanish Netherlands]’.

But my point here is that Lisola’s ‘common bulwark’ was a metaphorical one: not a plain reference, in other words, to Spain’s limited defence capabilities in Flanders but, on a different level, to the fortifying of people’s minds and spirits. Why? Because, as I will be showing later in this paper, the struggle against French universal monarchy, like Spanish universal monarchy in the sixteenth century, was a battle of ideas and sensitivities. As the subject of a Spanish Habsburg overlord, this is something Lisola captured with remarkable acumen.

The main point made by Lisola in this quote was that Louis’ legal pretentions to the Spanish Netherlands were in fact a spurious pretext to achieve two ends: *first* unlimited power through conquest; *second*, unlimited power through infiltration and division. Of the two, the latter end was deemed by Lisola to be the hardest nut to crack. What worried him was not so much Louis’ arbitrariness, whatever that was supposed to mean, but his ability to act as the arbitrator of conflicts; both international and domestic. To quote from *The Buckler of State*:

> Their (France) second maxim is to enter into all sorts of affairs either by right or wrong, and everywhere make themselves the arbiters either
by violence or by cunning, by authority or by surprise, by threatening or by friendship.

Universal monarchy, by Lisola’s standards, meant far more than a territorial overreach; it was a method of government; a tool of political domination across Europe.

So the next question is: how were Lisola’s ideas actually relayed on the ground? By whom and with what means? According to the existing sources, one of the driving-forces behind the diffusion of Lisola’s ideas in the Dutch Republic was Coenraad Van Beuningen. Van Beuningen was both a leading member of the Amsterdam City Council and a diplomat of considerable skills, well-versed in languages and Court protocols. This is a seminar in British rather than Dutch history. So I don’t want to dwell too long on the role played by Van Beuningen. But there are two things I do need to say:

(1) Van Beuningen was sent on a diplomatic mission to Paris in 1668 to cushion the effects of the Triple Alliance, which had greatly upset Louis. By that time, Van Beuningen had earned the reputation of having turned into a fierce opponent of Louis’ claim to the Spanish Netherlands—a sort of Dutch follower of Lisola who, according to French diplomatic sources, was making a serious dent into De Witt’s conciliatory approach to French foreign policy ambitions. The report he wrote for the States General in October 1668 is missing from the Dutch National Archives, but Martinus Franken’s correct assumption (confirmed by French sources) is that it was riddled with anti-French statements.

This explains why he was believed to be the author of an anti-French medal showing the Ancient Testament prophet Joshua holding out his hand in the sky to bring the sun to a stand-still. This medal caused the resentment of the French Crown, so much so that Lionne wrote to Pomponne, on his appointment as ambassador to the States General in 1669, to warn him about the noxious effect of Van Beuningen’s anti-French attitude:

Je commence à reprendre notre commerce en vous adressant deux pièces dont il me semble que vous pourrez tirer grand avantage à votre arrivée à La Haye pour faire connaître à toutes les Provinces-Unies la fausseté des impressions que M. Van Beuningen a données, c’est-à-dire que le roi n’est pas un engloutisseur de pays et d’États à tort et à travers [underlined in the original manuscript].

Let me resume our correspondence by sending you two pieces from which, I think, you will draw considerable benefit as you settle in The Hague. These pieces will help you debunk the false impressions Van Beuningen has spread across the United Provinces and explain that the King is not an insatiable devourer of states and countries.

As you can see, the legal spirit of *The Buckler of State* gradually morphed into a more colorful language; a language of images, metaphors and conceits that became the stock-in-trade of a wide variety of literary genres, ranging from pamphlets to satirical verse.

(2) After 1672, Van Beuningen was sent on several embassies to London and he played a key role in the marriage negotiations between William and Mary. He was in regular contact with Thomas Osborne earl of Danby, of course, but also
with the Civil War veteran Denzil Holles who, in a published letter of 1676 to Van Beuningen, made a case for a joint Anglo-Dutch interest in keeping French ambitions at bay:

Now the present mischief that are upon our country do not arise merely out of a common spring of boundless and restless ambition, but an implacable malice to the Protestant interest hath had a principal hand in the effects Europe is now groaning under and indeed the danger is common to both of us. For the French King, in growing so great a naval strength (will come back to this), may be reasonably apprehended to have his eye upon England, when he shall have subjugated the Spanish Netherlands.

I’ve talked briefly about the role of Van Beuningen in the Dutch Republic. I would now like to come to the particular situation of England. In London, Lisola liaised with Arlington and Buckingham, two key actors of early Restoration politics. The Imperial envoy described them as ‘friends and confidants of the House of Austria’. In terms of diplomatic arrangements, Lisola’s main target was to replicate at the level of the English Parliament what he had tried to do at the level of the Spanish Court, namely to provide money and ideas for the development of a pro-Habsburg faction.

In 1666-1667, Arlington and Buckingham sat in the House of Lords. It is not clear whether or not Lisola established any direct contacts with some members of the House of Commons. He probably did, but it may have been via Arlington and Buckingham. As the head of the Spanish faction at Court, Arlington sponsored the publication of *The Buckler of State* in 1667. In doing so, he was defending Madrid’s strategic interests in the Spanish Netherlands. Another reason was that Louis had declared war on England in 1666, in the middle of the second Anglo-Dutch war, as a response to Charles II’s secret alliance with the bishop of Münster. Lisola’s presence in England in 1666-1667 thus made sense. So did the uptake of his ideas in English writing after 1667.

Another important actor was the Spanish ambassador to the English Court, count Molina. According to the sources, Lisola held a number of secret meetings with Arlington, Buckingham and Molina to fine-tune his strategy. It was agreed that the people hated the French. So did the Parliament. Only the Court included a strong pro-French faction.

But hating the French was not enough to make the English pro-Austrian. Pro-Spanish to a certain extent because many English merchants had trading interests in Spain—there was a sizeable English merchant community in the port town of Cadiz, for example. As Baron de Vicq argued in a letter of 1672 to Sir Robert Southwell: ‘I am sure we passionately covet the continuance of peace with Spain [peace treaty signed 1665], our interest in trade and the security of Flanders oblige us to it’. A pro-Spanish position was a possibility but a pro-Austrian one must have sounded like a theoretical posture, in the sense that Austria appeared as somewhat of ‘a far-away land’ with indeed tenuous English connections. As Buckingham argued a little later in *A Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn* (1672):
Because we have thought it fit to defend our neighbours in Flanders, we must therefore presently march into the Empire, to defend there some who are not our neighbours, nor indeed within the reach of our protection. Now I would very fain know by this rule of theirs, when our poor countrymen should hope to be at rest.

Lisola very much appreciated this sense of a distance between Austria and England. In September 1667, shortly after the end of Louis’ successful campaign in Flanders, Lisola made the following suggestion:

溘Procuremos con papeles secretos así aquí como en las demás provincias descubrir las fraudes de la Francia, instilando a los pueblos lo que más puede promover y ser provechoso a nuestra causa.

With the help of secret papers, we will seek, here [in London] as well as in the other provinces, to uncover the wily intentions of the French Crown, instilling into people’s minds everything that can contribute to the promotion of our cause.

This quote calls for two short remarks:

(1) You find here an example of Lisola’s obsession with Louis’ double-dealing. It was Lisola’s consistent strategy to show that Louis’ might derived, not from his right, but from a fraud—ie a spurious interpretation of Brabant law.

(2) Louis’ Dutch wars cannot be summed up as a clash of arms between great powers. With every battle of swords came a battle of words that was managed from Vienna, and not, as is still thought, along an London-The Hague trench-line. The geography of anti-French ideas does need to be revisited in the light of Lisola’s strenuous efforts to oppose Leopold’s legitimate claim to a universal imperium to Louis’ great power pretensions. In 1658, after the death of Ferdinand III, Mazarin had floated the project of a French application to the Holy Roman Empire as a way of weakening the House of Austria. The project had foundered but, in the late 1660s, there were persistent rumours that Louis’ ultimate target was in fact to knock Leopold off the Imperial throne. To quote from a letter of 1668 of Carlingford to Arlington:

It is certain the French have done more by separating both these two Houses [i.e. Spain and Austria] by the jealousies they have cast between them in this last war [i.e. the war of Devolution of 1667-68], than by his conquest in Flanders. And we shall see whenever the King of France picks a quarrel to the Emperor the Spaniards as unconcerned as we have been in their quarrel. And without doubt he will, the Roman Empire being the noblest aim that the ambition of so aspiring a monarch can propose to itself (28).

The Buckler of State was only the first step toward the incorporation of Lisola’s ideas into the Dutch and English public sphere. One thing is certain: The Buckler of State set the standard for anti-French propaganda in post-1667 England. Take the example of A Free Conference touching the Present State of England in order to the Designs of France. The anonymous author of this
pamphlet of 1668 made a case for an alliance with Spain, rather than France—I wouldn’t be surprised if Arlington had been behind the publication of this work. One of the important points made by the author was the following:

In taking part with Spain we shall be the arbitrators of peace and war.
The cause is just and favorable [marginal note: vide The Buckler of State and Justice]; a young pupil unworthily oppressed [ref. to Carlos II of Spain, then age 8] as well as pretensions unjustly revived after an authentic renunciation [ref. to the marriage treaty of 1660 signed by the French and Spanish Crowns] are so many voices which speak to the root of our consciences.

Lisola was also the anonymous author of a number of other anti-French pamphlets, some of which found their way into England or the Dutch Republic in translation form and proved to be blockbusters. In September 1670, shortly before the French invasion of the duchy of Lorraine, the Danish envoy in London wrote to Christian V to let him know that ‘a book has been printed in Holland called La France démasquée. Copies of it have been sent to many persons, and it has made a strong impression upon some with respect to French designs’.

There is evidence that Sir William Temple was sent a copy of the French version of Lisola’s pamphlet by his Irish secretary John Donnellan. A Dutch translation was published in 1670. An English translation in 1680—at a critical juncture for the Stuarts—under the following title: The French Politician Found out, or Considerations on the late pretensions that France claims to England and Ireland and the Designs and Plots in order thereunto. The most remarkable aspect of this English title is the shift from Louis’ pretensions to the Spanish Netherlands to his supposed pretensions to England and Ireland. It as if the British Isles had become an extension of the Spanish Netherlands, rather than the contrary.

Let me now come to the ‘tilt’ of 1673. As an ‘Anglo-Dutch protestant moment’, the tilt of 1673 is a familiar story. I want to revisit it in the light of a Hapsburg connection. I want to show in particular that the protestant dimension of the Anglo-Dutch rapprochement of 1673 was only one side of the story.

In December 1672, shortly after the signing of an Austro-Dutch treaty and the taking of Charleroi by William’s troops, an Amsterdam-based physician by the name of Gabriel Piso recommended his patron Johan Maurits van Nassau a pamphlet written by Lisola in 1668 (reissued 1672) and called Remarques sur le discours du commandeur de Grémonville, fait au Conseil d’État de sa Majesté Impériale. A Dutch translation was published in 1673. This was Piso’s advice to Johan: ‘It is worth being read by a true lover of his country and I trust you will enjoy reading it as much as the disgraceful Lords [i.e. the regents] of our country’. Lisola had become an essential ingredient of Orangist feeling. A Lisola reader made a good patriot.

What about England? No English translation was published but I found a copy of the French version in the personal archives of Sir Joseph Williamson. More importantly, the gist of Lisola’s response to Grémonville was taken up in England’s Appeal from the private Cabal. The essential point here is that this pamphlet served as a conduit for a further diffusion of Lisola’s ideas into the English public sphere.
In his *Remarques sur le discours du commandeur de Grémonville*, Lisola had justified the King’s intervention in the Spanish Netherlands and the mounting pressure the French Crown was exerting on the Dutch Republic by the need to ‘reintroduce true divine worship and true religion’ (23). There was, in other words, a religious strand to the defence of Louis’ succession rights. Lisola’s refutation was the following.

The argument of religion was a specious one because, in fact, the French ‘had no religion at all’ (23). The French, in this sense, stood outside the sacred area of Christendom. In the conclusion, Lisola issued a warning to the French Crown. The memory of St Bartholomew’s Night still prevails in protestant memories, he admonished, and, if they have to, protestant countries will rise as a single body in defence of their rights and liberties (46).

Huguenot persecutions, which effectively began in the late 1660s, reminded English and Dutch pamphleteers of the Christian persecutions of the Roman Empire and Louis’ later alliance with the Ottoman Empire only served to confirm that he had indeed become a most un-Christian King. Not simply a papist, and, as such, an enemy to all protestants, but an enemy to all Christians. Tony Claydon is right to say that the struggle against universal monarchy tied into a broader debate over the nature of Christendom, rather than the standard opposition between protestant and catholic countries.

*England’s Appeal to the private Cabal* served to relay these ideas in England. One of the main strategic purposes of this pamphlet was to drag the English Crown into a pro-Dutch alliance against France, as had happened in the late 1660s. And, admittedly, this required considerable rhetorical savvy because, in the words of the Welsh MP William Williams ‘Dutch rhetoric cometh short of French eloquence which is one of such influence that all affairs are ordered according to their direction and all procedures modelled according to their interests’. One of the cutting-edge points made in *England’s Appeal to the private Cabal* was that:

> This is a war of religion, undertaken merely for the propagation of the catholic faith, and as the French minister at Vienna [Grémonville] expressed it in a solemn speech to the Emperor’s council...that the Hollanders being heretics, who had forsaken their God; all good Christians are bound to join and unite to extirpate them and to implore God’s blessing upon so good a work.

The whole idea of Louis’ Dutch War as a war of religion reverberated in the parliamentary debates of 1673-74, where Charles II had to face a gathering storm of opposition. Spurred into dissent by Dutch propaganda, the Country Party demanded the disbanding of Charles II’s standing army, the removal of Catholics from civil and military offices and, more broadly, the ‘de-Frenchification’ of English politics.

If you take Andrew Marvell’s *Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government* (1677), where you find a detailed report of the parliamentary debates of 1673-1674, you come across a formula which literally derives from *England’s Appeal to the Private Cabal*: 
Louis gave afterwards a more clear account of his conjunction with the English, and that he had not undertaken this war against the Hollanders, but for extirpating heresy. To the Emperor that the Hollanders were a people who had forsaken God, were heretics...and to other popish princes, that it was a war of religion in order to the propagation of the catholic faith.

Marvell scholarship has failed to take note of this literal import from a Lisola-inspired pamphlet. Many questions are still being raised about the possible connections between the Country party and the Dutch radical underground but, in this case, there is enough evidence to argue that the fuel for anti-French, anti-catholic and anti-Stuart propaganda was provided by Lisola, so that Dutch propaganda may be thought to have acted like a filter, weaving the various strands of Lisola’s multi-layered discourse into a uniquely protestant story.

I have demonstrated that, under the effect of Dutch propaganda, Lisola’s ideas about French universal monarchy morphed into a overarching protestant story, feeding into Anglo-Dutch political culture in a way that transcended the remaining confessional rift between the Church of England and the established Calvinist Church in the Netherlands. It is no small irony that a catholic propagandist should have paved the way for the creation of an overriding protestant sense of identity against Louis and, by extension, against the Stuarts.

This is actually an important point with regard to the long-term legacy of nineteenth century English and Dutch historiography. Both Thomas Macaulay and Robert Fruin saw in the struggle against French universal monarchy 1) a pursuit of the struggle against Spanish universal monarchy 2) a conflict between structurally different polities: popery and arbitrary government on the one side, religion and liberty on the other.

This paradigm, of course, has undergone considerable revision and very few people today would agree to say that the Glorious Revolution happened because it had to happen. However, there still remains a consensus to say that the struggle against the idea of absolute monarchy, based as it was on the defense of protestant interest, equated with a struggle against a Catholic Other. What a close study of Lisola’s writings shows is that the many pamphleteers who called for a closer Anglo-Dutch alliance against France took their cue from a catholic pamphleteer in the service of the catholic Holy Roman Emperor. An Emperor who, as Roger Morrice rightly noted in his diary, was no friend to the protestant minority of his Hungarian domains.

It may have been one of the great ‘cunnings of history’ for William’s rise to power as a protestant hero to be informed by the ideas of a catholic pamphleteer, born and raised in Spanish land and faithful until his last breath to his master the Holy Roman Emperor.